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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The parties disagree about the issues that were presented and preserved below and 
are properly raised on appeal. Appellee Logan City (the "City") therefore restates the 
issues herein as follows: 
A. Issues and preservation. 
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction or discretionary jurisdiction over parts of 
the district court's judgment that were expressly excepted and not designated in the 
timely Notice of Appeal filed by Plaintiff/Appellant David R. Daines ("Daines"). The 
City preserved this issue by its Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Docketing 
Statement filed in this Court on or about May 2, 2011.1 
2. Whether the district court correctly granted the City summary judgment on 
the claims set forth in Daines' operative Complaint: a claim for review of the City's 
Board of Adjustment decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801; a claim the 
proceedings before the Board denied Daines' procedural and substantive due process 
rights; and a claim the City's decision was "discriminatory," or violated Daines' right to 
equal protection. 
*In support of its position on this issue, the City incorporates by reference the 
points and authorities set forth in its opposing memorandum filed May 2, 2011, and does 
not further address the issue in this brief. 
1 
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The City preserved its position on these issues by its two motions for summary 
judgment and supporting papers. District Court Record ("R.") pp. 60-61, 63-89, 91-262, 
519-33, 651-52 and 654-67. 
Other issues which Daines describes and argues to some extent including: "did 
the premises search without consent or a warrant violate due process because it violated 
the . . . Fourth Amendment (Aplt's. Br. p. 3); and "[w]as the 2010 landlord licensing 
ordinance unconstitutional because of the ways it regulated multi-family nonconforming 
property rights" (id.); were not plead in Daines' Complaint or presented to or decided by 
the district court. R. pp. 1-35, 26-49, 279-300 and 327-46. 
B. Standard of Review. 
"When a lower court reviews an order of an administrative agency and [this 
court] exercise[s] appellate review of the lower court's judgment, [this court] act[s] as if 
[it] were reviewing the administrative agency decision directly and do[es] not defer, or 
accord a presumption of correctness, to the lower court's decision." Carrier v. Salt Lake 
County. 2004 UT 98,1117 (quotations, citations omitted). 
Like the district court's review, this Court's "review is limited to whether a land 
use authority's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 
85,1111. 
A land use authority's decision is arbitrary or capricious only 
if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. A 
land use authority's decision is illegal if it violates a law, 
statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was 
2 
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made. Because a determination of illegality is based on the 
land use authority's interpretation of zoning ordinances, we 
review such determinations for correctness, but we also 
afford some level of non-binding deference to the 
interpretation advanced by the land use authority. 
Id. (quotations, citations omitted). 
"An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or 
denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis 
v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, If 6 (quotations, citations omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This action arose after Daines requested the City's Community Development 
department to except a family home from zoning that restricted use of the home to a 
- single family dwelling, a request that the City "grandfather" a previously existing, 
nonconforming use as a multi-family dwelling. The City's Community Development 
Director ultimately denied Daines' request, and Daines appealed that denial to the City's 
Board of Adjustment (the "Board"). After two hearings and review of voluminous 
submissions, the Board partially granted and partially denied Daines' appeal. 
The Board found Daines had established that the home was originally built with a 
separate, basement apartment and could therefor be used as a duplex dwelling in a 
single-family zone. However, the Board found that the additional use Daines advocated 
3 
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as a three-unit apartment house, or in the alternative, a boarding/rooming house, had 
never been legally established and therefor could not be a nonconforming use as defined 
by the City's ordinances. 
Unsatisfied, Daines commenced this action with a Complaint and thereafter a 
First Amended Verified Complaint. R. pp. 1-45. He initially alleged, inter alia, that the 
original zoning was void, that the Board's decision was arbitrary capricious or illegal, 
and that the City had violated his constitutional rights in various ways. Id. 
B. Course of Pertinent Proceedings. 
The City answered Daines' Complaint, and then compiled the record of 
proceedings before the Board and submitted that record to the district court along with a 
motion for summary judgment on Daines' then pending First Amended Complaint. 
R. pp. 60-262. Daines responded by filing, in short order: i) a motion to partially 
dismiss and to amend his complaint "to conform;" ii) a motion to augment the record 
submitted by the City, to strike the City's summary judgment motion and to stay the 
proceedings for arbitration; iii) a second amended, verified complaint; and iv) a "motion 
to amend for partial dismissal with prejudice and substitute second amended verified 
complaint (B)." R. pp. 263-64, 270-71, 279-300 and 317-18. 
In relevant part, the City responded to these filings by transmitting to the district 
court the additional documents Daines had asserted were missing from the record of 
proceedings before the Board. R. pp. 347-411. Daines then filed his own motion for 
4 
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partial summary judgment addressing his request for review of the Board's decision 
pursuant to section 10-9a-801. R. pp. 418-19. 
In order to resolve the procedural issues then outstanding, including the City's 
pending motion for summary judgment on the original complaint and the filing of the 
second amended complaint without leave of the court, the parties stipulated to a Case 
Management Order ("CMO"). R. pp. 493-96. The CMO provided in pertinent part that 
Daines could have leave to file the "Second Amended Verified Complaint (B), which 
would be the operative Complaint in the case." Id. 
That operative Complaint sought declaratory judgments, injunctions, damages and 
attorneys' fees pursuant to U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988 based on three legal theories: 1) a 
claim the Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious and illegal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9a-801; 2) claims the proceedings before the Board and its decision denied 
Daines' procedural and substantive due process rights; and 3) a claim the City's decision 
was "discriminatory," or violated Daines' right to equal protection. R. pp. 327-46. 
By the stipulated CMO, the parties also agreed that they would first address the 
Petition for Review claim in the operative Complaint by cross-motions for summary 
judgment based on the record provided to the district court. R. pp. 493-96. Thereafter 
the parties fully briefed cross-motions on that claim, and after oral argument, the district 
court denied Daines' then pending motion and granted the City's motion for summary 
5 
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judgment on the Petition for Review component of the operative Complaint. R. pp. 582-84. 
The court upheld the Board's decision on the record on the grounds that the City 
had adopted the Uniform Building Code, which at all relevant times required a 
Certificate of Occupancy for a change from a single family home with a basement 
apartment to a three-unit apartment house or a boarding/rooming house, but that Daines 
had not established that such a certificate had ever been obtained. Id Accordingly, the 
use Daines advocated had never been legally established and could not be a 
nonconforming use as defined by the City's ordinances. JdL 
Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment addressing the 
remaining procedural and substantive due process and equal protection claims pled in 
the operative Complaint. R. pp. 594-95, 651-52. After the motions were fully briefed 
and after oral argument, the district court again denied Daines5 motion and granted the 
City's motion, thereby resolving the remaining claims. R. pp. 779-82. 
The court granted the City's second motion for summary judgment essentially on 
the grounds that: 1) the Board had afforded Daines ample, procedural due process, 
2) his substantive due process claim failed because the Board's decision was not 
arbitrary, capricious or conscience shocking, and 3) his equal protection claim failed 
because he did not establish that any allegedly unequal treatment resulted from 
intentional discrimination based on personal animus unrelated to the duties or position of 
any City employee or official. R. pp. 779-81. 
6 
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Within thirty days of entry of the Order, Daines filed a Notice of Appeal, stating: 
This appeal is taken only from the part of the Summary Judgment 
dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief alleging 
denial of a right to procedural due process in the Board of Adjustment 
quasi-judicial hearings, and from the denial of equal protection by 
excluding only non-conforming rights appeals from the process and 
protections of the Administrative Enforcement Code, an issue on which the 
Court failed to rule. No appeal is taken from the dismissal with prejudice 
of Plaintiffs First, Third and Fourth claims for relief. 
R. p. 790. 
C. Response to Daines' Statement of Facts. 
Daines asserts that his facts: 
are drawn primarily from the record of the Board of Adjustments 
proceedings and undisputed statements of fact in the memorandums in 
support of the Trust's (1) first and (2) second motion for partial summary 
judgment; and (3) cross motion for final summary judgment on the 
remaining claims presented by the Trust. 
Aplt's. Br. p. 8. The City does not dispute Daines' statements which derive primarily 
from City ordinances and transcripts of the administrative proceedings before the Board. 
Many, if not most, of Daines5 statements, however, are legal characterizations or 
argument, were not presented to the district court,2 or are simply not material as more 
fully explained below. Moreover, Daines does not marshal the facts supporting either 
2For example, while Daines did submit certain excerpts of minutes and ordinances 
to the district court, it is not clear that any of the actual documents contained in "Tab 
10" of his addendum were submitted to either the Board or the district court. They are 
apparently submitted to support a constitutional challenge to the City's landlord 
licensing law (Aplt's. Br. pp. 3, 46-47), which challenge was never presented to the 
district court. 
7 
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the Board's or the district court's decisions. Accordingly, the City provides those facts 
and summarizes the process under review in the following paragraphs with citations to 
the record provided to the district court: 
1. In his papers submitted to the district court, Daines established that the 
home at issue: 
(1) was built as a duplex in 1952 as a family home with a 
basement apartment; (2) after the death of Verna's husband 
in 1959, she added boarding and rooming house uses without 
any structural changes; (3) in 1988 she added a three plex 
status by dividing the family portion of the home into two 
dwelling units with two bathrooms without structural changes 
by closing two doors; (4) the original and added uses 
continued to Verna's death in March of 1990; and (5) her 
Trust has continued those uses until the present time. 
Pi's. Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Statement of Facts, 11 37, R. p. 430. 
2, In 1959 when the owner "added boarding and rooming house uses without 
any structural changes" referenced above, the Building Code adopted by City ordinance 
provided in pertinent part as follows: 
Sec. 306. (a) Use or Occupancy. No new building or 
structure in Groups A to H, inclusive [subject property 
defined in Group H], shall be used or occupied and no 
change in the existing occupancy classification of a building 
or structure or portion thereof shall be made until the 
Building Official has issued a Certificate of Occupancy 
therefor as provided herein. 
(b) Change in Use. Changes in the character or use of a 
building shall not be made except as specified in Section 502 
of this Code. 
8 
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Sec. 502. No change shall be made in the character of 
occupancies or use of any building which would place the 
building in a different division of the same group of 
occupancy or in a different group of occupancies, unless such 
building is made to comply with the requirements of this 
code for such division or group of occupancy. 
No change in the character of occupancy of a building shall 
be made without a Certificate of Occupancy as required in 
Section 307 of this Code. 
1946 Uniform Building Code, §§ 307, 502, R. pp. 226-27. 
3. In 1988 when the owner "added a three-plex status by dividing the family 
portion of the home into two dwelling units with two bathrooms without structural 
changes" as Daines described it, the Building Code adopted by City ordinance provided 
in pertinent part as follows: 
Sec. 307. (a) Use or Occupancy. No building or structure of 
Group A, E, I, H, B or R, Division 1 Occupancy [subject 
property defined in Group R, Division 1], shall be used or 
occupied, and no change in the existing occupancy 
classification of a building or structure or portion thereof 
shall be made until the Building Official has issued a 
Certificate of Occupancy therefor as provided herein. 
(b) Change in Use. Changes in the character or use of a 
building shall not be made except as specified in Section 502 
of this Code. 
Sec. 502. No change shall be made in the character of 
occupancies or use of any building which would place the 
building in a different division of the same group of 
occupancy or in a different group of occupancies, unless such 
9 
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building is made to comply with the requirements of this 
code for such division or group of occupancy. 
EXCEPTION: The character of the occupancy 
of existing buildings may be changed subject to 
the approval of the building official, and the 
building may be occupied for purposes in other 
groups with conforming to all the requirements 
of this code for those groups, provided the new 
or proposed use is less hazardous, based on life 
and fire risk, than the existing use. 
No change in the character of occupancy of a building shall 
be made without a Certificate of Occupancy as required in 
Section 307 of this Code. The building official may issue a 
Certificate of Occupancy pursuant to the intent of the above 
exception without certifying that the building complies with 
all provisions of this code. 
1985 Uniform Building Code, §§ 307, 502, R. pp. 223-24. 
4. Under City ordinance, a nonconforming use cannot be considered "legally 
existing," so it can be continued despite subsequent changes in zoning ordinances, if the 
use was not properly established in conformance with code requirements in the first 
instance: 
No use may be considered a legally existing nonconforming 
use under the provisions of this Title if the use was never 
lawfully established, including and not limited to, any 
combination of appropriate license, permits or fees. 
Logan Municipal Code §17.59.040, R. p. 422. 
5. On or about March 29, 2006, the City notified Daines5 predecessor-in-
interest that the subject property needed to be brought into compliance with the 
10 
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applicable single-family zoning, or the trustee needed to make application to 
"grandfather" the property as a "legally existing nonconformity]." See Compliance 
Request Letter and attachments, R. pp. 113-51. 
6. In response, on or about April 26, 2006, Daines' predecessor filed an 
Application to Determine Legally Existing Nonconforming Status. See Application, 
R. pp. 153-54. 
7. In support of the Application, Daines submitted a "Grandfathering 
Statement" and other supporting papers. See Grandfathering Statement, R. pp. 155-62. 
8. In further support of the Application, Daines submitted a letter reiterating 
the contentions set forth in the "Grandfathering Statement." See Letter of July 20, 2006, 
R. p. 164. 
9. City staff responded to Daines' application indicating that staff had 
preliminarily determined that the home could not be "grandfathered" because of 
questions about whether prior uses were legally established. See Letter of July 27, 2006, 
R. p. 166. The letter indicated that staff would consider any other information the owner 
wished to provide up until August 25, 2006, and directed Daines' representatives to 
contact James Geier, the Neighborhood Improvement Coordinator, if they had questions. 
Id, 
10. Daines did contact Mr. Greier, who had clarified staff's concern was not 
with whether Daines had or could establish that its predecessor had in fact used the 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
home as four separate units, but whether use of the home as four separate units had ever 
been lawfully established in accordance with existing codes and regulations. See, e.g., 
Daines5 Letter of July 28, 2006, R. pp. 168-70. 
11. Thereafter Daines submitted "additional" information to City staff in the 
form of 15 affidavits from various family members. See R. pp. 172-80. 
12. Daines then received responses to certain GRAMA requests. In light of 
the information received, Daines requested additional time up until September 15, 2006, 
to submit additional information in support of its Grandfathering Application. See 
Letter of August 16, 2006, R. pp. 181. 
13. On or about September 11, 2006, Daines notified the City that, after 
reviewing the City's 1985 zoning ordinance, he conceded that the home could not be 
considered as being legally divided into four separate units prior to 1989. Daines 
therefor modified its Grandfathering Application to no longer request consideration as a 
four-plex, but to "claim the right to choose and elect between the three-plex 
grandfathering and the 1985 Ordinance's permitted use as a 'Boarding or Rooming 
House' " Letter of September 11, 2006, R. pp. 183-84. 
14. On or about September 22, 2006, the City's Community Development 
Director denied Daines' Application on the grounds that the uses Daines claimed for the 
home were not legally established at the time of the 1989 zoning ordinance. See Letter 
of September 22, 2006, R. p. 186. 
12 
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15. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701, the City had established a Board 
of Adjustment. Logan Municipal Code § 2.54.010. By ordinance the Board had the 
following powers and duties: 
2.54.040: Powers and Duties: 
A. The board of adjustment shall hear and decide variances from the 
terms of the zoning ordinance. 
B. The board of adjustment shall hear and decide appeals of any order, 
requirement, decision, or determination made by an administrative 
official. 
Logan Municipal Code, § 2.54.040. 
16. In addition the City's Land Development Code sets forth the various types 
of land use decisions or actions and the appropriate body to hear the appeal from said 
decision or action: 
Table 17.57.030: Appeals Boards and Project Types 
" Interpretations of the Land Development Code Board of Adjustment 
Boundary Line Adjustments Board of Appeals 
Conditional Use Permits Board of Appeals 
Design Review Permits Board of Appeals 
Subdivisions Board of Appeals 
Nonconformity Determination by Staff Board of Adjustment 
Other Zoning Related Actions by Staff Board of Adjustment 
Land Development Code § 17.57.030. 
13 
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17. Accordingly, by his denial letter the Director notified Daines of the right to 
appeal the decision to the Board of Adjustment within 15 days of the date of the letter. 
See Letter of September 22, 2006, R. p. 186. 
18. On or about October 6, 2006, Daines filed a "Challenge to Authority, 
Appeal, Petition for Upzone and other Variances at 545 Boulevard" with the City's 
Board of Adjustment. See Challenge to Authority, Appeal, Petition for Upzone and 
other Variances at 545 Boulevard, R. pp. 188-91. By that document, in essential part, 
Daines, "challengefd] the 'Board' of Adjustment's authority, and alternatively appealed] 
and petition[ed] for variances" from the effect of the Director's denial of his 
grandfathering application, id. 
19. The Board scheduled a hearing on Daines' appeal for November 14, 2006. 
See Notice, R. p. 193. Pursuant to City Ordinance, the City provided the Staff Report 
which described staff's position on the appeal to Daines on November 8, some six days 
prior to the hearing. See Staff Report, R. pp. 195-97. 
20. On November 14, 2006, the Board held a hearing on Daines' 
grandfathering appeal. See November 14, 2007, Minutes, R. pp. 199-205. Before 
starting the hearing, and in light of Daines' challenge to the Board's authority, the Board 
adopted "Board of Adjustment Bylaws and Rules of Procedure." Id. See also Aplt's. 
Br. 1111 33-35. 
14 
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21. At the hearing, Daines presented voluminous materials, including 
numerous affidavits from various family members which in substance and effect 
supported the factual assertions in Daines' "Grandfathering Statement," i.e., that: 1) the 
home at issue was built in 1952 and included a basement apartment; 2) from 1952 until 
1959 when the father of the family died, the home was occupied by the Daines family 
and perhaps others in the basement apartment; 3) from 1959 until approximately 1990 
Daines5 predecessor "operated all of the home, except the west basement apartment, as a 
board and room variety boarding house for a mix of her remaining children, needy 
foreign students, relatives and others." See Minutes, R. pp. 199-205. 
22. Daines did not present evidence, however, that Daines or his predecessor 
in interest had ever requested or received a change of use or Certificate of Occupancy 
for anything other than the original occupancy of the structure and original use in 1952. 
Id 
23. To allow itself time to consider the materials presented and any additional 
submissions, the Board continued the hearing, and scheduled an additional hearing for 
January 2, 2007. IcL The Board requested that any additional information be submitted 
within a week. IdL 
24. City staff submitted an addendum to its earlier report, which took the 
position that Daines had not presented evidence that 3 or 4 separate living units had 
been legally established because a three- or four-plex established in 1988: 
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would have required building code compliance including, but 
not limited to 1-hour firewall construction between units. As 
no permits were obtained and no such construction has been 
documented to exist, staff believes that individual units do 
not exist within the home. 
See Staff Report Addendum, R. pp. 221-22. Staff went on to concede, however, that 
"an exception to this would be the basement apartment. The existence of this unit, in 
staff's opinion, was well substantiated in the November meeting. Staff now has no 
concerns with the legal recognition of the basement apartment (two units total, within 
the home.)" IdL 
25. With respect to the Rooming and Boarding claim, staff noted, in pertinent 
part: 
Specific to Rooming and Boarding, staff offers the 
following. The property zoning allowed for 
Rooming/Boarding houses at the time of the March 15, 1989 
letter referred to and included with the affidavits. The 
zoning restricting such use was adopted in November of 
1989. No Planning/Zoning permits were required in the 
1985 Code; as stated by the proponent, it was a principally 
permitted use. A building permit for "change of occupancy" 
would have been required. Since the 1947 Building Code, a 
building permit has been required for change of occupancy. 
City documentation of Building Permits, since 1963, is quite 
complete. No documentation of a building permit exists for 
the proponent's property - even as late as 1989. As such, 
staff does not believe that the structure had a legal occupancy 
change and that the rooming/boarding use of the property 
was not legally established. 
UL 
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26. Daines submitted additional information and a written response to staff's 
submission, which summarized Daines' evidence and arguments. See Trust Reply to 
Addendum and Closing Statement, R. pp. 231-53. 
27. On January 2, 2007, the Board again convened a hearing on Daines' 
application. The minutes reflect the following exchanges took place: 
Mr. Mortensen [board member] stated that he had asked the 
City for a copy of the code and they provided it. The 1946 
code says there cannot be a change in the existing occupancy 
classification or structure or any portion thereof until the 
Chief Building Official issues a permit. Mr. Daines has 
provided a lot of affidavits about the change in use in 1959 
to a boarding house or triplex. He asked Mr. Daines to 
comment on the use o[r] occupancy portion of the code that 
he just read. 
Mr. Daines stated that the City claims a building permit is required 
for any change in occupancy. He asked whether the City enforces 
that every time there is a change in occupancy. 
Mr. Croshaw [board member] pointed out it says the character of 
occupancy. 
Mr. Mortensen asked Mr. Daines what he considers their occupancy 
classification to be. 
Mr. Daines stated he felt it was interesting that the weekend of 
Christmas was the first time that this issue about change or 
character of occupancy has ever been raised. His scanning of what 
he was just barely handed about the building code has a number of 
exceptions in it and he would need time to thoroughly read it. The 
bottom line, regardless, is asking what Verna Daines should have 
done to make it legal. The City is saying she should have come 
down in 1959, stated she planned to use her boarding house, and got 
a permit. 
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Mr. Mortensen clarified that the code says a permit has to be issued 
by the Chief Building Official when there is a change of occupancy 
character. He stated he understood that Mr. Daines does not think 
that was enforced by the City. 
Mr. Daines stated that was correct. He read from page 3 of the 
document he submitted today, stating that if technically required, a 
variance is required. He stated that literal enforcement of the 
ordinance would cause a hardship on the applicant. 
Mr. Housley [city attorney] reminded Mr. Daines that this Board 
cannot grant a [use] variance and that use variances of this type are 
prohibited by state law. This appeal is not eligible for use 
variances. 
Mr. Daines stated he was asking for a variance from the 
requirement of obtaining a building permit. 
Mr. Paul Taylor [building official] stated that permits are required 
anytime someone alters, improves, enlarges, or changes a building. 
A change of occupancy or use, modifying a dwelling unit into 
multiple units, increases the hazard to the people that are in there. 
Because of that, [the] building code has more restrictions. Anyone 
wanting to make such a change needs to come in and find out what 
is necessary to make that new occupancy work. Certain occupancy 
changes have no difference in hazard or may even be less 
hazardous, so the requirements may already have been met and no 
permits are required. This situation is an increase in hazard. Egress 
is based on occupancy. Life safety issues like smoke detectors, 
number of allowed kitchens in a single family dwelling, etc. His 
interpretation of a boarding house is one kitchen and multiple 
bedrooms. Mechanical codes also apply. They need a permit to 
inspect the gas piping to add an additional range to ensure there is 
enough gas to serve all the appliances. There are 4-5 codes that 
regulate what you do. New outlets require a permit to make sure 
they are properly sized. It's the same with plumbing. Even when 
you replace a fixture, you need a permit to make sure the proper 
materials are used. 
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Mr. Mortensen stated that the 1946, 1985 and 1988 codes all talked 
about occupancy and the Chief Building Official issuing a 
certificate of occupancy. He asked Mr. Taylor if he or his 
department had ever issued a Certificate of Occupancy where there 
were no structural changes. 
Mr. Taylor stated they had. It depends on whether it is really 
needed. Verbal occupancy is based on certain things for occupancy, 
but every day they issue permits for change of use. 
See January 2, 2007, Minutes, R. pp. 255-62. 
28. At the conclusion of the January 2 meeting the Board deliberated and then 
voted unanimously to grant the appeal to the extent it sought use of the home as a 
duplex, but to deny the appeal for any additional use, including any use as a tri-plex or 
rooming/boarding house. Id. 
29. As Daines summarized the process before the Board in papers submitted to 
the district court: 
The hearing continued for the afternoon of November 
14,2006 and the afternoon of January 2, 2007 when it ended. 
Both sessions of the hearing proceeded as announced in the 
Agenda, and followed the past practices of the Board as 
expressed in their first rules. The Chair read the agenda item; 
the staff summarized its report to the Board; the "proponent 
or advocate" made his presentation; then public comment 
was encouraged. Following the public comment the Board 
closed the hearing, deliberated on the issues and made the 
decision. R 150 (1) & (2), Tab 3 p 4. The chair moved the 
agenda along and held down redundancy by limiting time 
allowed for comments when he deemed it necessary, set 
guidelines for public input, and referenced handouts and 
procedures during the meetings. Tab 1 p 10, F 4. 
Pi's. Mem. in Supp. of Second Mot. for Summ. J., Statement of Facts, H 33, R. p. 618. 
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30. Within 30 days, Daines then filed his Complaint in the district court. R. p. 
1. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Daines5 appeal depends primarily on varied assertions that his nonconforming use 
claim should have been decided by a Hearing Examiner under the City's Administrative 
Enforcement Code, and because the City instead directed his appeal to the Board, that 
body's decision was arbitrary, capricious, illegal and violated Daines' constitutional 
rights. 
This apparently major component of Daines' appeal fails quite simply because by 
its own plain terms the Administrative Enforcement Code is a permissive, rather than 
mandatory, enforcement mechanism. No City ordinance appoints a Hearing Examiner as 
an appeal authority over any land use decision, but City ordinances do unambiguously 
appoint the Board as the authority to which an appeal of a nonconforming use decision 
must be made. Indeed, there is no "violation" of City ordinances a Hearing Examiner 
could address until after the Board makes a final decision on a responsible person's 
claim of a nonconforming use. 
To the extent they are cognizable, Daines' secondary arguments similarly fail. 
The Board enacted the bylaws and rules required by ordinance prior to hearing or 
deciding Daines' appeal, and Daines does not demonstrate the bylaws were non-
compliant in any way. The Board and district court review provided Daines with ample 
procedural due process, and the Board's decision is well supported by evidence in the 
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record and a rational basis, and so is not arbitrary or capricious in any way. Under the 
circumstances, Daines' substantive due process and equal protection claims fail as a 
matter of law. 
Daines' remaining, vaguely defined claims that an administrative search violated 
the Fourth Amendment and the City's Landlord Licensing Ordinance is unconstitutional, 
were not plead in the operative complaint nor presented to the district court. This Court 
should not now address them on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
In light of the express exceptions in Daines' Notice of Appeal, the apparent 
expansion of the issues in his subsequently filed proposed Amended Docketing 
Statement, and the difference between the Amended Docketing Statement and the nature 
of the arguments ultimately presented in Appellant's Brief, it is not entirely clear what 
issues Daines appropriately raises here. That said, it is clear that Daines' primary 
arguments are premised on the repeated assertions that the Board's decision is void and 
violates various constitutional rights because the City should have utilized its 
Administrative Enforcement Code and a Hearing Examiner to address his 
nonconforming rights claims. See, e.g., Aplts.' Br. at 1-3, 26-40. These assertions are 
unsupported, and because they are so central to Daines' arguments the City will address 
these arguments first. 
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I. THE CITY'S ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT CODE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO DAINES' NONCONFORMING RIGHTS CLAIMS AND 
THUS HIS ARGUMENTS ARE UNSUPPORTED AND FAIL AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
As set forth above, the premise which apparently underlies Daines' primary 
arguments, which he describes in his summary as including "arguments A through H" of 
his brief,3 is that the City's Administrative Code pre-empted the Board proceedings. He 
3Daines' summary of argument illustrate his premise that the Administrative 
Enforcement Code somehow governed the nonconforming right proceeding: 
The unconstitutional means employed by the City to carry out this 
policy of rights termination are detailed in Arguments A to H infra and 
include disregard of the AE Code's application to the City's entire 
administrative enforcement, quasi judicial and legislative processes related 
to nonconforming rights and other code violations. Under the guise that 
land development procedural rules rather than AE Code procedural rules 
applied, the City (1) initiates charges and makes searches without probable 
cause and without required warrants; (2) forces targeted and random multi-
family owners into staff grandfathering proceedings where; (3) the staff 
whimsically, arbitrarily and capriciously finds legal multi-family rights are 
single-family; (4) then misdirects appeals from the AE Code Hearing 
Examiner who has quasi-judicial appeal authority to the Board who has no 
authority; (5) the Board has not adopted valid rules of procedure needed 
for its authority, even if it had subject matter authority; (6) the Board 
actually conducts appeals as an ad hoc legislative policy making body 
under the pretext it is a quasi-judicial body; (7) in 2010 the Council 
adopted an unconstitutional landlord licensing ordinance that multiplies 
and accelerates its nonconforming rights termination policy and 
contravenes its 2004 AE Code, and; (8) in all stages of the administrative 
enforcement process, the City disregards the rules of procedure that the 
City established for itself in the 2004 AE Code and has failed to 
implement with required rules of procedure. 
Aplt's. Br., Summary of Argument, pp. 25-26. 
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argues that: i) "[a]ll Board appeal jurisdiction was encompassed in and pre-empted by 
the 2004 AE Code LDC;" ii) "the AE code jurisdiction clause covers the entire 
administrative enforcement process and appeals;" iii) "all the appellate authority of the 
Board under the 1997 Ordinance was superceded by the appellate jurisdiction of the 
Hearing Examiner . . . that also applies to all levels of the enforcement process;" 
iv) "[minutes] . . . confirm that grandfathered rights-occupancy issues coverage was the 
Council's primary intended objective in the code's coverage;" v) "[t]he failure to provide 
notice to the Trust of its remedy to appeal the code violation charge . . . to the Hearing 
Examiner . . . shows the City's disregard of the AE Code at all levels and was per se 
arbitrary;" vi) "the City ignores the AE Code . . . and then disingenuously reverts back 
to the AE Code for abatement procedures;" vii) "[a]ppeals that by any stretch of the 
imagination should be going to the Hearing Examiner under the AE Code are directed to 
the de facto Board of Adjustment by the City Attorney;" viii) "the AE Code does 
establish a uniform presumption of legal existence for nonconforming uses;" and ix) 
"[t]he Hearing Examiner is without authority to act and any actions taken by him and the 
'enforcement officials' are invalid and outside their authority until this AE Code 
requirement is complied with." Aplt's. Br. pp. 27-36 (emphasis in original). 
From this premise Daines deduces that the process the City provided before the 
Board was unconstitutional and the decision was arbitrary, capricious and illegal. Id. 
However, Daines' arguments fail in light of the plain language of the City's ordinances. 
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First, the City's Administrative Enforcement Code provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
17.60.030. Scope 
The provisions of this Title may be applied to all violations of the Logan 
Municipal Code or applicable state codes which occur within Logan City 
limits and such territory outside Logan City limits over which the City has 
jurisdiction or control by virtue of any constitutional provision or law. 
This Title establishes an additional remedy that may be used by the City to 
achieve compliance with applicable codes. 
17.60.040. Existing Law Continued. 
The provisions of this Title shall not invalidate any other title, chapter, or 
ordinance of the Logan Municipal Code, but shall be read in conjunction 
with those titles, chapters, and ordinances and shall be used as additional 
remedy for enforcement of violations thereof. 
17.60.090. General Rules of Interpretation. 
For purposes of this Title: 
(2) "Shall" is mandatory; "may" is permissive. 
17.60.130. General Enforcement Authority. 
Whenever an enforcement official finds that a violation of the Logan 
Municipal Code or applicable state codes has occurred or continues to 
exist, he may undertake any of the procedures herein. The director or any 
designated enforcement official shall have the authority to gain compliance 
with the provisions of the Logan Municipal Code and applicable state 
codes subject to the provisions of this Title. Such authority shall include 
the power to issue notices of violation and administrative citations, inspect 
public and private property, abate nuisances on public and private property, 
and to use any remedy available under this Title or law. 
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17.60.220. Powers of Hearing Examiner. 
F. A hearing examiner shall not make determinations as to the existence 
of nonconforming rights. If a responsible person claims a nonconforming 
right as a defense, the hearing examiner shall continue the administrative 
enforcement hearing and shall refer the matter to the Logan City Board of 
Adjustment for a determination as to the existence of the nonconforming 
right. The Board of Adjustment's decision shall be binding on the hearing 
examiner. . . . 
Logan City Administrative Code, §§ 17.60.030, .040, .090, .130 and .220 (emphasis 
added).4 
As the Court is well aware: 
Under applicable rules of statutory construction, "we look 
first to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning." 
We also "interpret [the statute's] provisions in harmony with 
other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes 
under the same and related chapters." "[I]f we find 
ambiguity in the statute's language, we look to legislative 
history and other policy considerations for guidance." 
Similarly, the Logan City Land Development Code provides in pertinent part: 
17.61.030. Use of "Shall" and "May." 
A. "Shall" Means Mandatory 
The word "shall" means that the directives or requirements are mandatory 
and may not be waived or modified. If used within the text, "will" and 
"must" also mean "shall." 
B. "May" Means Permissive 
The word "may" means that the directives or requirements are permissive 
and are imposed at the option of the decision-maker. "Can" and "strive" 
also mean "may." 
Logan City Land Development Code, § 17.61.030. 
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Heber Light & Power Co. v. Utah PSC 2010 UT 27, II19 (citations omitted). 
Applying these principles here, the plain and unambiguous terms of the 
Administrative Enforcement Code make its application to any proceeding concerning a 
violation of City Ordinance permissive, rather than mandatory. It is an "additional 
remedy," but cannot be utilized to address nonconforming use issues like Daines raised 
in this case. Thus Daines5 central theory that the Administrative Enforcement Code 
"pre-empts" proceedings before the Board is unsupported by the Code itself. 
Moreover, Daines5 arguments ignore the very structure of the City land use and 
appeal ordinances. Under both Logan Municipal Code section 2.54.040 and Logan Land 
Development Code section 17.57.030 the Board of Adjustment is designated as the 
appropriate appeal body for requests for variances, interpretations of the land 
development code and all other zoning related actions by staff. In Daines5 original 
appeal to the Board of Adjustment he specifically "petitions for variances55 as an 
alternative to overturning the "Department's denial of the Trust's grandfathering 
application.55 Under either theory he describes, the appropriate appeal body is the Board 
of Adjustment. 
On the other hand, no statute or ordinance designates a Hearing Examiner under 
the Administrative Enforcement Code as an appeal authority. Based on the structure of 
the ordinances, if a "responsible person55 claims a nonconforming use right, that claim 
must be resolved through the appropriate land use appeal process before there is even a 
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"violation" a Hearing Examiner could address. Only if Daines were to continue to use 
his dwelling as three units in violation of the Board's nonconforming rights decision 
would the Administrative Code and a Hearing Examiner be a permissive option to be 
used to enforce what would then be a code violation. 
Thus Daines5 primary arguments must disregard not only the permissive language 
of the Administrative Enforcement Code itself, but City ordinances' appeal structure. 
The arguments provide no basis whatsoever for the relief Daines requests. 
II. THE BOARD FOLLOWED ALL APPLICABLE PROCEDURAL 
REQUIREMENTS IN HEARING AND DECIDING DAINES' APPEAL. 
Secondarily, Daines goes on to argue: 
Even if the Board had subject matter appellate 
jurisdiction over nonconforming rights determinations, which 
it does not (Arguments A. 1-9 supra), its failure to adopt the 
due process rules of procedure required by the 1997 
Ordinance rendered its de facto actions invalid and beyond 
its jurisdiction. The de facto proceedings are a primarily 
record of admissions by the City. 
Aplt's. Br. p. 36. See also id p. 3 (describing issue). 
Daines is correct that Logan City Code section 2.54.030 provides: 
The board of adjustment shall adopt bylaws for its procedures and 
operations and shall ensure that the bylaws comply with any ordinance 
adopted by the [city] council. 
Logan City Code § 2.54.030. 
Indeed, the record established that pursuant to this provision and in response to 
Daines' own filings, before hearing and deciding Daines' appeal the Board did in fact 
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adopt bylaws and rules of procedure. See Minutes of Nov. 14, 2006, Meeting, R. p. 
199. 
Daines does not attempt to demonstrate that the bylaws and rules of procedure the 
Board did adopt failed to comply with any ordinance. Rather, quoting selectively from a 
treatise for the proposition that an agency's "attempt to exercise a power without 
compliance with the provisions as to the manner and circumstances of its exercise is a 
nullity" (Aplt's. Br. p. 37, citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 277),5 Daines 
argues that the Board's "failure to adopt the due process rules of procedure required by 
the 1997 Ordinance rendered its de facto actions invalid and beyond its jurisdiction." IdL 
p. 36. 
Daines' argument is simply inapplicable because the Board had adopted bylaws 
and rules as required by ordinance before hearing or deciding his appeal. Apparently 
attempting to make his argument relevant, Daines goes on to characterize the Board's 
bylaws and rules of procedure as "invalid on their face," as "defacto legislative pretext 
for quasi-judicial procedural rules," as "continuing ultra vires proceedings," or as 
"invalid" and "void." Id. pp. 38-40. However, these characterizations are wholly 
5Daines omits from his quoted material the caveat that an agency's failure to 
follow procedural provisions does not render an administrative action a nullity unless 
"the provisions are mandatory and involve matters of substance and not mere 
technicalities." 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 277. In addition, the section cited 
does not appear to contain the first paragraph of the language Daines includes and 
purports to quote. 
28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unsupported by any citation of applicable authority or analysis of the Board's bylaws and 
rules. Daines' arguments with regard to bylaws and procedure provide no basis for a 
finding of illegality or to overturn the Board's decision. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE CITY 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON DAINES' DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAIMS. 
A. Daines' Due Process Claims Fail as a Matter of Law. 
Daines appears to appeal the district court's decision dismissing his due process 
claims. See Notice of Appeal, R. p. 790; and Proposed Amended Docketing Statement, 
filed April 16, 2011. At least by implication, his arguments derive from the City's 
failure to apply or follow the arguably more stringent requirements of the Administrative 
Enforcement Code in dealing with the nonconforming use of the subject property. See, 
e.g.. Aplt's. Br. pp. 1-3, 26-40. These arguments are unsupported by citation to any 
applicable authority and fail for the reasons set forth above, and in the paragraphs 
below. 
It is well settled that in order to prove any due process violation sufficient to 
recover under section 1983, Daines must establish a constitutionally protected property 
interest: 
To prevail on a due process claim, a party must first establish 
that it has a 'protectible property interest.5 This is an interest 
in which one has 'a legitimate claim of entitlement.5 It is not 
"an abstract need for, or [a] unilateral expectation of, a 
benefit." Rather, it is a "right to a particular decision reached 
by applying rules to facts." 
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See also Heideman v. Washington City. 2007 UT App 11, U17, 155 P.3d 900, 906 
(citations omitted). 
Here, however, Daines points to no "right to a particular decision reached by 
applying rules to facts," and has not cited any case or other authority which has 
recognized a due-process property interest in a nonconforming rights proceeding like 
that which the Board undertook in this case. The Court's observation in Patterson v. 
American Fork City. 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d 466, is applicable: 
Many courts have held that adverse municipal land-use 
decisions are not actionable under § 1983 because a 
developer does not typically have a claim of entitlement to a 
favorable decision. 
Patterson. 2003 UT 7, U 24 (citations omitted). 
Even assuming Daines was entitled to procedural due-process protections, under 
Utah law: 
due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Instead, due 
process is flexible and, being based on the concept of 
fairness, should afford the procedural protections that the 
given situation demands. The minimum requirements are 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful manner. 
Dairy Prod. Serv. Inc. v. Wellsville. 2000 UT 81II 49 (citations, quotations omitted). 
See also Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 R2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1991) 
("The strict rules of evidence and procedure that apply in a courtroom,... need not 
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apply in an administrative hearing. Hearsay and other forms of evidence that might be 
inadmissible in a court of law may be considered during an administrative hearing."). 
Here, the district court correctly determined the City provided Daines with ample 
notice and opportunities to be heard. The Community Development department granted 
Daines numerous extensions to submit materials, and the Board did the same, including 
scheduling a second hearing. The Board carefully considered Daines5 submittals and 
arguments, and partially granted Daines' request in light of the evidence it reviewed. 
Daines was provided further process before the district court upon judicial review of the 
Board's decision. Daines has not and cannot cite any authority for the proposition that 
his procedural "due process" rights have been violated under the circumstances. 
Daines' substantive due process claim also fails on the merits. "[Sjubstantive due 
process ensures the state will not deprive a party of property for an arbitrary reason 
regardless of the procedures used to reach that decision." Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe 
City Council. 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). "Substantive due process requires 
only that termination of a protected interest not be arbitrary, capricious, or without a 
rational basis." Hennigh v. City of Shawnee. 155 F.3d 1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 1998). As 
more fully set forth below, there was and is an entirely rational basis for the Board's 
decision, and thus his substantive claim also fails. 
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B. Dailies' "Discriminatory Enforcement" or Equal Protection Claim 
Similarly Fails. 
To establish that the City's decision could constitute some sort of equal protection 
violation, Daines relies upon the "class of one" rationale described in Village of 
Willowbrook v. Olech. 528 U.S. 562, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060, 120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000). 
Aplt's. Br. pp. 40-42. Daines characterizes the City's request that he apply for a 
grandfathering exemption as retaliation for his accusation that the City had attempted to 
"extort" a gift of street frontage and as "targeting] this beautiful home." Id. These 
arguments fail for several reasons. 
First, the Board's decision can give rise to no equal protection violation because 
regardless of alleged ill-will, malice and dissimilar treatment, the Olech equal protection 
review requires only a rational basis for the challenged decision. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 
(recognizing a plaintiffs right to bring an equal protection claim as a "class of one, 
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others 
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in 
treatment.")(emphasis added). See also Gardner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2008 UT 6, 
11 39 (reviewing class of one claim and noting that "[a]n equal protection claim that, as 
here, does not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class is subject only to rational 
basis review."). 
As the Tenth Circuit recently explained: 
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The paradigmatic "class of one" case, more sensibly 
conceived, is one in which a public official, with no 
conceivable basis for his action other than spite or some 
other improper motive (improper because unrelated to his 
public duties), comes down hard on a hapless private citizen. 
Perhaps he is the holder of a license from the state to operate 
a bar or restaurant or other business, and the official deprives 
him of a valuable property right that identically situated 
citizens toward whom the official bears no ill will are 
permitted the unfettered enjoyment of. As one moves away 
from the paradigmatic case, the sense of a wrong of 
constitutional dignity, and of a need for a federal remedy, 
attenuates. 
Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County. 440 F.3d 1202, 1209 (10th Cir.2006) 
(quoting Lauth v. McCollum. 424 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
By the same token, where there is evidence of a rational government basis for the 
challenged decision, then the class-of-one claim fails as a matter of law regardless of 
allegations of malice, ill-will or improper governmental motivation. As the Tenth 
Circuit noted in Jicarilla: 
Even if subjective ill will is a necessary condition for a 
class-of-one claim, it is not a sufficient one. If there was an 
objectively reasonable basis for the Defendants' actions in 
this case, the district court did not err in granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants on that ground without 
allowing further discovery on the question of subjective ill 
will. 
Jicarilla, 440 F.3d 1210-11. 
Applying these principles here, Daines' equal protection argument fails because 
he has not and cannot negate the conclusion that the Board's decision to deny his 
nonconforming rights application had a rational basis. Id. In fact, it remains undisputed 
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that Daines' property was in violation of the zoning laws, Daines was never able to 
establish that the owner obtained the "appropriate license [or] permits" when the owner 
changed the uses and occupancy of the property in 1959 and in 1988, and thus the owner 
did not have a "legally existing nonconforming use" as defined by City ordinance in this 
case. There was a rational basis for the City's action. 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in upholding a summary judgment dismissing 
similar claims in Patterson v. American Fork: 
We also find that Pattersons' allegations are insufficient to 
state a claim for an equal protection violation under Olech's 
"class of one" rationale. Federal courts have clarified that to 
make out a prima facie case for violation of equal protection 
under a "class of one" theory, "the plaintiff must present 
evidence that the defendant deliberately sought to deprive 
him of the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a 
personal nature unrelated to the duties of the defendant's 
position." A showing of "uneven" enforcement of the law is 
not sufficient: what is required is a showing of a "'totally 
illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the defendant.'" 
The burden of proving discriminatory intent under Olech is 
"'an onerous one.'" [11] Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to Pattersons, we have no choice but to dismiss 
their equal protection claim; Pattersons have not specifically 
alleged that any unequal treatment they experienced was the 
result of intentional discrimination grounded in personal 
animus. . . . Thus, we are inclined to heed Justice Breyer's 
cautionary language in Olech and hold that Pattersons' 
allegations of unfair treatment in this "run of the mill" zoning 
case do not amount to equal protection violations. 
2003 UT 7, UH 33-34. 
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Even giving Daines the benefit of his own recitation of the facts in this case, he 
fails to meet the "onerous burden" of demonstrating the City "deliberately sought to 
deprive him of the equal protection of the laws for reasons of a personal nature unrelated 
to the duties of the defendant's position." As set forth above, the Board's decision is 
supported by the evidence it considered. As in Patterson, Daines' claims of unfairness 
in this run of the mill nonconforming use case do not rise to the level of a cognizable 
violation of rights to equal protection. 
IV. THE DECISION AT ISSUE WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS. 
In a conclusory fashion, Daines argues that: 
[t]he Director's denial of the Trust's application for 
grandfathering in view of his disregarded of overwhelming 
affidavit and other proof he solicited that proved it was a 
legally established nonconforming boarding-rooming house 
triplex, without any substantial evidence to the contrary was 
arbitrary and capricious. In this case his disregard of the 
solicited overwhelming evidence was motivated by his and 
the City's declared policy of terminating legal nonconforming 
multi-family rights as detailed in Argument H infra. . . . [11] 
The Director's letter solicitation of affidavits and 
commitment to consider that proof in his decision was his 
agency rule that he failed to abide by in this case. As stated 
in the general rule above this is per se arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Aplt's. Br. pp. 44-45. This argument also fails for a number of reasons. 
First, as the party challenging the grandfathering decision, Daines bears the 
burden of proof, and must marshal all the evidence in the record to demonstrate that the 
findings and decision are not supported by substantial evidence: 
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It is incumbent upon the party challenging the Board's 
findings or decision to marshal all of the evidence in support 
thereof and show that despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings 
and decision are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 R2d 602, 604 n. 7 (citations omitted). 
See also Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). 
Daines' brief falls far short of marshaling all evidence supporting and 
contradicting the Board's decision in order to demonstrate to this Court that the decision 
was not supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, he does not even address the actual 
basis for the decisions he challenges. 
As the minutes and staff reports in the record reflect, the issue that concerned 
both City staff and the Board was not whether Daines' predecessors had made a multi-
family or rooming-boarding use of the home during several relevant time periods as 
Daines' claims was established by "overwhelming affidavit and other proof." Rather, 
the issue was whether Daines could prove that the uses he advocated had ever been 
legally established so they could be considered legally nonconforming uses as defined by 
the City's ordinances. See R. pp. 255-62. 
On appeal, Daines points to no evidence that at the time the property owner 
instigated the "tri-plex or boarding/rooming" nonconforming uses at issue, the owner 
obtained Certificates of Occupancy to ensure the changes complied with other aspects of 
the Building Code and that the structures were such that the occupancy changes did not 
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endanger the health, safety and welfare of potential occupants. See, e.g., 1946 and 1985 
Uniform Building Code, §§ 307, 502 (quoted supra at WI 2, 3). Because he did not do 
so in the proceedings before the Board and does not do so now, there is no dispute the 
owner did not have a "legally existing nonconforming use" as defined by City ordinance 
in this case. Under the circumstances, there was nothing arbitrary or capricious about 
the challenged decisions. 
V. DAINES DID NOT PLEAD, NOR DID THE DISTRICT COURT 
CONSIDER, ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE CITY'S 
LANDLORD LICENSING ORDINANCE NOR ANY CLAIM FOR 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH, AND THIS COURT SHOULD NOT 
ADDRESS THOSE CLAIMS HERE. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." Tschaggenv v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37 1f 20, 163 P.3d 615. "The rule 
exists 'to give the trial court an opportunity to address the claimed error, and if 
appropriate, correct it.'" Id. (citations omitted). It also "prevents a party from avoiding 
the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if the strategy 
fails." Id. See also Gardner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs.. 2008 UT 6, If 32 ("The 
Landowners did not appeal the decision of the district court with respect to their trespass 
claim; they simply presented us with their new physical takings claim. Because the 
Landowners did not present that claim below, the claim is deemed waived and we will 
not address it for the first time on appeal."). 
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The operative Complaint on which the parties' motions and the district court's 
judgments were based is completely devoid of any reference to any unconstitutional 
search, the Fourth Amendment, or the City's Landlord Licensing Ordinance. R. pp. 
327-46. Not surprisingly, the district court found no occasion to address a Fourth 
Amendment claim or a claim that the City's Landlord Licensing Ordinance was 
unconstitutional in any way in its summary judgment decisions. R. pp. 582-85, 779-82. 
Under the circumstances, Daines' claims in this regard cannot be raised on appeal and 
should not be addressed by this Court. Gardner, supra. 
Even if the Court were willing to address such claims, however, Daines does not 
provide a sufficient factual or legal basis for the rulings he apparently requests. With 
respect to his Fourth Amendment argument, the "search" to which Daines apparently 
objects was an inspection to determine how many housing units were being utilized on 
Daines' property for purposes of zoning compliance. It had nothing to do with any 
criminal investigation or potential charge. Aplt's. Br. pp. 43-44. 
Daines fails to address whether and to what extent whatever administrative search 
occurred interfered with any expectation of privacy or was or was not supported by 
probable cause. Id. He fails to cite any authority except the City's Administrative 
Enforcement Code, which did not apply, for the proposition that consent or a warrant 
was required. KL Under the circumstances, he fails to establish any Fourth Amendment 
violation. See, e ^ , State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15 Ml 25-26 ("Another instance in which 
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warrantless searches are sometimes held to be reasonable is the so-called administrative 
search . . . which does not have criminal investigation as its goal."). 
Although the basis for Daines' challenge to the City's Landlord Licensing 
Ordinance are also unclear, he does describe the ordinance as a "Provo style landlord 
licensing ordinance." Aplt's. Br. p. 46. In Anderson v. Provo City. 2005 UT 5, the 
Utah Supreme Court denied a challenge to Provo City's Landlord Licensing Ordinance 
and held that the Provo ordinance and associated amendments "constitute land use 
regulations within the zoning power of the Provo City Municipal Council." Anderson, 
2005 UT 5,1116. The Court went on to hold that the Ordinance "does not violate 
owners' constitutional rights to the uniform operation of laws, to equal protection, or to 
travel, and is not an invalid restraint on alienation." Id. II 29. 
Except for opprobrious characterizations of the policy underlying the ordinance, 
Daines fails to allege or prove the ordinance has ever been applied to him. Aplt's. Br. 
pp. 46-48. In light of Anderson v. Provo, and absent any citation to authority or 
analysis, Daines' challenge to the City's Landlord Licensing Ordinance fails even if the 
Court were inclined to address it. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the City respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the district court's summary judgments and order of dismissal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _J^_ day of August, 2011. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
^ 2 — 
By / ^ ^ ^ 
Jody K Burnett 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Appellee Logan City 
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